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Managing Residual Clearance:
Learning From Europe’s Past
Lessons learned from residual clearance in post-1945 Europe may apply to long-term clearance
efforts after more recent conflicts.
by Samuel Paunila [ GICHD ]

I

n light of current conflicts, it is easy to forget that many
European countries still manage World War I (WWI)

Responsible governments logically adopt a proactive

and World War II (WWII) explosive remnants of war

approach to ERW during and immediately after armed

(ERW) contamination. Over decades, these countries devel-

conflict. Implementation usually involves a rapid survey

oped practices and policies that could help shape priority set-

covering large areas with clearance operations aiming for

ting and risk management in countries more recently affected

exhaustive eradication of ERW, at least in priority areas.

by ERW. Post-conflict countries could learn from the early

With time and progress, these operations usually report a

mistakes in European responses and benefit from practical ap-

decline in ERW encountered and make priority and highly-

proaches that address residual threats at varying depths and

contaminated areas safe from surface and shallow ERW.

with differing time frames.

Meanwhile, institutional knowledge within the responsible

The historical evolution of best practices since WWII can

authority improves on typology, extent and implications of

also assist countries in policy design beyond the fulfillment of

the remaining contamination.4 With less ERW to address, the

commitments under the international Convention for Cluster

high costs of proactive clearance yields decreasing marginal

Munitions (CCM) and the Convention on the Prohibition of

returns and, in absolute terms, often debatable increases in

the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel

public safety. The reduced threat from remaining ERW raises

Mines and on Their Destruction (Anti-personnel Mine Ban

the need for the country to readjust its priorities and response

Convention or APMBC). Understanding when to start and

policy to better reflect modern risk management.5

stop the implementation of proactive clearance serves as an
excellent foundation for residual clearance policies.1

World War II Lessons

Understanding Before Acting

sive and prolonged bombardments from air, sea and land dur-

Several European and Asian countries experienced exten-

One of the immediate challenges facing countries

ing WWII, resulting in significant ERW contamination per

recovering from armed conflict is the prevention of further

square kilometer (247 ac) of territory.6 In fact, more than 30

casualties from ERW contamination. After addressing

countries continue to discover and clear WWII-era ERW. For

immediate concerns, including protecting citizens and

instance, the U.K. regularly recovers deeply buried bombs

critical national infrastructure from explosive hazards,

from the greater London area. Many ERW remain at the bot-

governments strive to secure safe environments for daily life

tom of the River Thames. Germany’s experience of bomb-

2

and socioeconomic recovery. With internal and external

ing during WWII was more intense and sustained, leaving a

pressures in play, the following limitations often characterize

widespread legacy of surface and shallow contamination in

this early stage:

cities and the countryside. Two million tons of ordnance were

• No time for planning comprehensive surveys
• Inadequate information on the scale and impact of ERW
contamination

• Policymakers’ inability to approach the threat of ERW
through risk management.
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From Proactive to Responsive

dropped, with an estimated 100,000 unexploded bombs remaining in present-day Germany.7 Up to 10 aircraft bombs
are still found yearly in Berlin alone.
The intensity of the destruction in specific areas of the U.K.
and Germany compares with the shelling and bombing of

As a result, some countries provided ambiguous estimates regard-

Laos and Vietnam, which began with the battle of Dien Bien

ing years of ERW clearance required, adding to the confusion.3

Phu in 1954 and continued through the end of the Vietnam
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Balham underground station in Southwest London after a raid on the evening of 14 October 1941, when 68 people died after
pipes burst causing water and silt to fill the station.
Photo courtesy of Imperial War Museum.

War in 1973.8 Sixty years after the First Indochina War and 40

danger to population and infrastructure. On the other hand,

years since the war in Vietnam, the management of residual

they needed to assess available technical and human resourc-

ERW in this region is highly relevant and could benefit from a

es, as well as their efficiency and associated costs. The reality

fresh perspective and transfer of knowledge.

of these competing priorities was no more apparent than in

After WWII, European governments had to make major
decisions on prioritization and public safety, assessing econ-

post-WWII London, where more than one million destroyed
buildings needed to be rebuilt.9

omies of scale in dealing with residual abandoned and un-

The policies of that era were guided by early applications of

exploded ordnance. The primary regulator for the evolution

risk management and implemented by experienced, yet often

of policies prior to establishment of the International Small

poorly equipped, operators and advisers. The first two decades

Arms Control or International Mine Action Standards was

after WWII could be described as a showcase of varying degrees

common sense; not every square meter could or should be

of resilience in London and Berlin, learning from mistakes

cleared in each area suspected of containing ERW. The con-

of unregulated work while pushing for new perspectives

tamination had to be treated differently depending on if the

and procedures for ERW practices. During the 1970s, civil-

ERW was at the surface or buried. Economic and infrastruc-

reporting mechanisms became more effective by moving

ture pressures often resulted in release of land to the popu-

data from war archives to the first interactive information-

lation before it was guaranteed that the land was safe to a

management systems. The management of residual ERW soon

specified depth. It was, and still is, every citizen’s responsibil-

evolved as a mechanism of shared responsibility with specified

ity to be vigilant and report ERW findings to local authorities.

tasks for armed forces, emergency services, civil servants,

Evolution of Policies

Since 1945, countries’ responses to ERW evolved through

citizenry, and more recently for commercial contractors.
Proactive, Reactive, Responsive

a series of reality checks. On the one hand, authorities had to

The U.K.’s early ERW response policies were primarily

weigh the extent and type of contamination with the de facto

reactive, and Germany implemented a combination of
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For instance, the response requirements
for ERW on the surface and at shallow depths
vary significantly to that of the U.K.’s deeply buried bombs, wherein the latter are mitigated reactively by default. A good example of
this policy’s implementation is the construction project of the Queen Elizabeth Olympic
Park in London prior to the Summer Olympic
Games in 2012. The entire area was heavily
bombed during WWII. Based on the bombing
data, deeply buried ERW could emerge during
the park’s construction.15 A risk assessment
deliberately avoided proactive clearance of the
park. The level of preparedness was raised for
the reactive bomb disposal. After an air bomb
was recovered, an expert examined it and, as
anticipated, was unable to pinpoint the implications of corrosion in the metal and explosive
Locations of bombs reported to have fallen during the period of the London
Blitz in and around the area of the London Olympic Park.
Photo courtesy of www.bombsight.org.

reactive and proactive policies. In both contexts, assessing,
treating and reducing risk became a suitable approach to
managing residual ERW. The policy implementation had to

establish whether the bomb presented a danger in its current location and the extent of
protective works needed.

Lessons Learned

be transparent to the public, thus reflecting society’s values

Central to managing residual ERW is strong national own-

while including liability aspects in light of decreasing public

ership of risk and response, and well-performing authorities

tolerance toward ERW casualties.

with solid understanding of liability, operational efficien-

Present ERW clearance in European countries is largely

cy and risk management. ERW tasks are best suited to be the

responsive compared to operations conducted immediately

shared function and responsibility of civil defense and mili-

after WWII. Many of the affected countries now operate on

tary that maintain the budgets and mobile-response capacity.16

the premise that ERW contamination cannot be totally elimi-

Following the organizational structure, suitable infor-

nated, but the hazards associated with remaining ERW can

mation management and reporting systems differentiate be-

be mitigated through risk education, responsive local threat

tween surface (and shallow subsurface) contamination and

assessments and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD).10 This

deeply buried bombs. Clearance of the former and other sur-

assumption of acceptance of long-term residual risk and dif-

face items with particular humanitarian impact are included

ferentiation between responses on surface, shallow and deep

in States Parties’ obligations toward the CCM and APMBC.

residual contamination starkly contrasts with the admirable

Such surface items include cluster munitions banned by the

yet abstract policies that continue advocating for total eradi-

CCM and anti-personnel mines banned by the APMBC. Trea-

cation of ERW.

ties do not ban other items such as mortar bombs and hand

11,12

Emerging countries that experienced major bombardments following the 1960s, such as Laos and Vietnam, com-
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components. However, the expert was able to

grenades, but they are dangerous and render a humanitarian
impact if detonated.

pleted most of their post-war reconstruction and now enter

Deeply buried bombs cannot be easily surveyed over

long-term development. However, some of their current con-

large areas nor can communities readily identify them; of-

tracting and budgeting modalities encourage continued pro-

ten they become a challenge only after being discovered dur-

active ERW clearance over less expensive survey activities,

ing construction and development activities. Therefore, most

land-use assessments and risk reduction through spot EOD.13

long-term contamination that does not pose immediate hu-

Moreover, policymakers may overestimate the impact of ERW,

manitarian danger could be addressed by adopting a risk-

in particular that of deeply buried bombs.14

management approach and introducing more sustainable,
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Figure 1. Annual quantity of UXO disposed of in West Berlin (1,000 kg), 1947–2011.
Figure courtesy of GICHD.

commercially viable response models.

and appropriate to the intended use of

For financing institutions and donors,

the contaminated land. Adoption of

selecting such an approach would allow

such policies would enable efficient re-

investment to focus on manageable and

source allocation while providing better

important tasks, not the all-encompass-

developed perceptions of residual ERW

ing clearance of countries.

and associated risks.

Conversely,

national

authorities

See endnotes page 65

would be responsible for developing
policies to manage long-term residual

The Geneva International Centre for

ERW. In such an environment, prog-

Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) be-

ress would be defined in terms other

gan a study of post-1945 ERW response

than the sum of square meters cleared

policies and practices in 2013, focusing

and number of ordnance destroyed. Re-

on management of residual risks. The

cent propositions for hundreds of years

research project extends to 15 countries

of continued ERW response in Laos

and serves to facilitate knowledge trans-

and Vietnam should be significantly re-

fer and advise policymaking on residual

duced by dissecting the contamination

ERW among national governments and

into its components and assessing the

donors. Beyond this study, GICHD assists

actual degrees of risk.

in developing sustainable national lead-

Lessons from the European WWII

ership and capacities to confront residual

experience advocate moving away from

contamination while increasing the role,

proactive clearance practices and poli-

and sharpening the structure of national

cies to responsive long-term survey and

security services in ERW response.
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clearance mechanisms that are sustainable, proportional to the reduced threat
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